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Africaisbeing annihilatedby wars, gross 
violations of human rights, economic 
ruin and ecological disasters. Events in 
Somalia, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, 
Zaire, Uganda, the Sudan, Chad, Algeria, 
South Africa, Malawi and Kenya 
demonstrate the enormity of this 
tragedy. Indeed, many African states are 
disintegrating in the wake of these 
problems, thus exacerbating the refugee 
crisis on the continent. What factors are 
responsible for uprooting millions of 
refugees and internally displaced 
persons from their communities? Why 
does the African refugee crisis persist? 
Why have the traditional permanent1 
durable solutions of voluntary 
repatriation, local integration and 
resettlement in third countries failed to 
address the plights of too many refugees 
for too long? 
The Colonial Factor 
Refugees are a result of conflict and 
dislocation in society. They are also a 
result of indifference to violations of 
human rights. In precolonial Africa 
refugees were generated by political, 
religious and economic conflict, as well 
as by slave raids, the slave trade and 
ecological disasters. This situation was 
exacerbated by the European partition 
and occupation of the continent. 
Boundaries were artificially and 
arbitrarily drawn and redrawn with no 
regard to human settlements and 
physical geography. The aspirations, 
wishes and needs of the African peoples 
were disregarded. The boundaries 
sometimes divided an ethnic group into 
two or more countries. For example, the 
Somali ended up in Kenya, Ethiopia and 
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Somalia; the Tulani and Bariba in Ghana 
and Ivory Coast; the Masai in Tanzania 
and Kenya; the Ntribus and Ewes in 
Togo and Ghana; the Manjaks in Senegal 
and Guinea Bisau; and the Tuarag in 
Mali, Niger and Algeria.' The creation of 
colonial boundaries, therefore, led to 
population displacement and 
fragmentation of social and ethnic 
structures. It also led to border claims 
and border wars. For example, the 
border disputes between Somalia and 
Ethiopia, and Kenya and Somalia are a 
product of the colonial experience. The 
conquest and subsequent colonization of 
the continent were carried out through 
wars, manipulations and coercion. 
Colonial labour, land and taxation 
policies alsoled to migration, conflict and 
flight.2 As the struggle for political 
independence gained momentum in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the crisis of 
colonialism generated hundreds of 
thousands of refugees across the 
continent. A few examples will illustrate 
the point. The Algerian war of 
independencelliberation caused the 
flight of some 200,000 Algerians to 
Morocco and Tunisia between 1954 and 
1962. Similarly, the wars of liberation 
against Portuguese ultracolonialism in 
Angola, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique sent hundreds of 
thousands of refugees fleeing to Malawi, 
Tanzania and Zambia. The liberation 
war in Zimbabwe displaced an 
estimated half a million peoplea3 
Apartheid and the strategy of 
destabilization of southern Africa led to 
grossviolations of human rights, internal 
displacement and flight.4 
Neo-Colonial Factors: Politics 
In many African countries, 
independence was immediately 
accompanied by ethnic rivalries and 
violence, militarism, coup d'etats, 
dictatorship, corruption and gross 
violations of human rights. Ethnic and 
religious conflicts between the Hutus 
and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, 
conflicts between the Khartoum 
government and Southern Sudanese led 
to large-scale refugee movements. In 
retrospect, Mekuria Belcha concludes: 
Many of today's refugee flows in 
Africa have their root causes in the 
colonial period. Colonialism has 
drastically altered the basic parameters 
for the future development of many 
African societies. It has stunted sodo- 
economic development. For a century or 
more, most Africans were ruled by aliens 
who used systems and structures that 
few among the indigenous populations 
understood or were supposed to 
understand. When the colonialists left, 
there was an institutional vacuum. The 
economic and political systems 
instituted by colonialism were not 
adaptable to the new situation either due 
to lack of people who could make them 
work or simply because the systems 
were incompatible with the conditions 
that evolved after independence. 
Because colonial rule was essentially 
authoritarian and oppressive, the 
colonial legacy to African political 
development was undemocratic 
practices and intolerance of dissident 
views. In other words, there were no 
viable political institutions that allowed 
democratic participationby the majority. 
Consequently, political and economic 
crises are common features of most of the 
postcolonial societies in Afr i~a.~ 
Political repression is certainly one 
of the major factors generating refugees 
in Africa. However, as the state 
delegitimizes itself under the crisis and 
the state's international support withers, 
the struggle for democracy and justice 
continues to gain momentum on the 
continent. African states under military, 
one-party, all-party or no-party rule are 
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coming under enormous popular 
pressure. Across the continent African 
peoples are agitating for political 
pluralism, accountability and respect for 
human rights. It is common knowledge 
that most African rulers do not want to 
relinquish power. It is, however, 
important to point out that transitionto 
multiparty democracy is already taking 
place in some parts of Africa. In Zambia, 
the transition to multiparty democracy 
was generally smooth. Kenya and 
Tanzania have joined the growing list of 
states preparing for democratic 
pluralism. This critical period of 
transition to multiparty democracy must 
be properly managed to avoid more 
conflicts on the continent. Surely, 
democratic pluralism will not 
necessarily provide shelter, put more 
food on the matltable, cure disease or 
ensure higher prices for Africa's primary 
commodities; nonetheless, it is a major 
step in addressing the root causes of the 
refugee crisis. 
In Liberia, the dictatorial regime of 
President Samuel Doe, which had 
enjoyed strong U.S. support for much of 
the decade, finally collapsed with Doe's 
death in early September 1990. On the 
eve of the total demise of the Doe regime, 
thousands of Liberians fled to Monrovia, 
thinking that the US. Marines stationed 
on ships off the coast of Liberia would 
protect them. The refugees were bitterly 
disappointed-the U.S. Marines were 
there to protect and evacuate only 
Americans and nationals of Western 
countries6 Similarly, those who 
expected the United Nations and the 
international community to intervene 
and stop the destruction of human lives 
were disappointed. Other than the Red 
Cross and the Belgian medical relief 
group, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), 
it was only the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) that in 
August deployed a peace-keeping force, 
the Economic Community Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG), in Monrovia. 
Although the mission was extremely 
expensive and controversial for the West 
African states, the presence of ECOMOG 
had some positive effects on the crisis. 
However, as the World Refugee Survey 
(1991) notes: 
Liberia produced 1990's largest new 
outflow of refugees. More than 730,000 
Liberians are now living as refugees in 
neighbouring countries, primarily in 
Guinea (33,OOO), Cote d'Ivoire (270,000), 
and Sierra Leone (125,000), with smaller 
numbers in Ghana (8,000), Nigeria 
(1,700), and other countries. At least 
500,000 other Liberians are thought to be 
displaced within Liberia, bringing the 
total number of civilians uprooted by the 
civil war to 1.26 million, more than half 
the total population of Liberia. ' Vio- 
lations of human rights continue, 
especially against the Krahns (Doe's 
ethnic group) as it was previously done 
against the Manos and the Gios? 
In Somalia the autocratic regime of 
Mohammed Siad Barre, which had ruled 
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the country for twenty-one years, 
crumbled in 1991. However, as in Liberia, 
violations of human rights and the 
refugee crisis continue unabated. In his 
work, Somalia: At W a r  with Itself, R. 
Omaar observes that: 
Nineteen ninety-one is the year Somalia 
died. Sincefull-scalecivil war brokeout on 
November 17, at least 14,000 people have 
been killed and 27,000 wounded in the 
capital city of Mogadishu. Most of the 
casualties are civil&ns. Rivalry between 
the forces of two ruthless men-interim 
President Mohammed Ali Mahdi and 
General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, both of 
whom belongto thesameclan and thesame 
movement, the United Somali Congress 
(USC)-has made Mogadishu an 
exceptionally dangerous place. In addition 
to troops loyal to both men, hundreds of 
armed "freelance" soldiers and looters 
contribute to the violence. . . . Lack of 
adequate medical care is another reason for 
the numerous casualties. Both factions 
have been extraordinarily callous, 
attacking hospitals and periodically 
interfering with the work of doctors, 
nurses, and aides. Hospitals do not have 
minimal nursingsupport, suffer shortages 
ofmedical supplies, andareswollen to three 
times theircapacity. . . . In March 1992, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
said that "horrifying levels of 90 percent 
moderate and severe malnutrition" had 
been found in the area surrounding Belet 
Huen in central Somalia and in thecamps 
of displaced people around Mercu, south of 
Mogadishu. It estimates that 1.5 million 
people in and around Mogadishu may be 
affected by famine, and puts at 4.5 million 
the number throughout the country who 
are threatened by s t a r ~ t i o n . ~  
By way of relevant digression, it 
should be borne in mind that despite the 
human rights disaster in Somalia and the 
starvation that millions of people face, 
the UN and Western governments have 
been reluctant to intervene and save 
human lives. The UN has belatedly 
managed to send some unarmed 
observers to the country. The 
organization, however, is still waiting for 
every warlord in the country to "allow" 
the UN troops to get into the country 
before millions of lives can be saved. 
Ironically, the UN, Western 
governments and the international 
media have responded quite differently 
to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and 
the rest of Eastern Europe. A question 
may be posed: do the starving and dying 
Somalis or Liberians have rights to life? 
Economic Factors 
The escalating indebtedness, the high 
rate of mortality, malnutrition, famine 
and rapidly declining productivity are 
clear signs of the continuous economic 
and political marginalization of the 
continent. The economic crisis in Africa 
exacerbates violations of human rights, 
political instability and refugee 
problems. The economic crisis has both 
internal and external causes. To be 
precise, corruption, embezzlement of 
public funds, militarism, inefficiency 
and the onerous debt-service burden are 
some of the main contributing factors. 
On the question of debt crisis, the UN 
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African Recovery Program Briefing Paper 
notes that: "Debt and debt-service ratios 
have risen faster for Africa than for any 
other group of countries. Relative to 
GNP, the debt ratio for Sub-Saharan 
Africa is nearly twice as large as that for 
theworld'shighly-indebtedcountries.. . 
Thirty-one countries are now officially 
classified as 'debt-distre~sed' ."~~ 
Similarly, in their discussion of the 
politics of reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Y. Bangura and P. Gibbon point out that: 
The great majority of countries in Sub- 
Saharan Aficahawadopted-moreor less 
inv~luntaril~-~rog&mes of economic 
reform designed by the international 
financial institutions. These "structural 
adjustment programmes" haw included 
producer price reforms, removal of 
subsidies, liberalization of internal and 
external trade, new foreign exchange 
regimes usually involving severe 
devaluations, the introduction of "cost 
sharing" for state-supplied services, 
privatisation, restructuring of 
government institutions and more 
recently, legal refoms aimed at supplying 
an "enabling environment. " Structural 
adjustment has been devised by the 
internationalfinancial institutions on the 
assumption that economic growth in Sub- 
Saharan Africa will only be resumed 
through a contraction of state activity and 
the development of liberalised markets." 
Structural adjustment as a new aid 
and development paradigm is being 
vigorously promoted by most Western 
aid donors. The assumption the 
Canadian government and other donors 
make is that respect for human rights is 
linked to the adoption of free-market 
economic policies.12 According to R. 
Carver, British Foreign Secretary 
Douglas Hurd stated that: "Countries 
tending towards pluralism, public 
accountability, respect for the rule of law, 
human rights, and market principles 
should be encouraged. Governments 
who persist with repressive policies, 
with corrupt management, or with 
wasteful and discredited economic 
systems should not expect us to support 
their folly with scarce aid reso~rces.'"~ 
However, countries like Kenya, Uganda 
and Malawi-which do not practise 
political pluralism, spend heavily on 
militarism and have poor human rights 
records-continue to receive 
international development assistance 
because of the World Bank-approved 
structural adjustment programs. 
Structural adjustment programs 
have led to violations of human rights 
and socio-economic and political 
repression, instability and flights in most 
African countries. In Ghana, the military 
government has resorted to overt 
repression to enforce reduction in 
government spending in areas such as 
health care, education, food subsidies 
and public sector wages. In Zambia the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank conditions provoked 
popular hostility that was met with 
. . . it k difJicult to draw a 
Jrm line between those 
refugees who are victim of 
environmental disasters and 
those who are victim of 
human-made political and 
economic oppression. 
severe repression in June 1990. A total of 
twenty-four demonstrators in Lusaka 
and the Copperbelt were shot to deathby 
the police and antirobbery squad. 
However, opposition to structural 
adjustment, which was closely 
connected to opposition to one-party 
rule, finally led to the demise of the one- 
party system in the country. Similarly, in 
February 1990 when the Ivorian 
government introduced substantial tax 
increases for both primary sector and 
publicworkers, peaceful protests against 
the World Bank and IMF measures were 
met with massive repression. As it 
happened in Zambia, opposition to 
structural adjustment became linked to 
opposition against the one-party system 
that had been in place since 
independence in 1960. In October 1990 
the first multiparty elections were held. 
In Gobon andBenin, popular opposition 
to structural adjustment measures 
resulted in opposition to repressive and 
undemocratic political systems, In 
Zimbabwe strikes by teachers and other 
workers opposed to the program were 
banned under the emergency law. In 
May 1989 there were mass protests in a 
number of Nigerian cities against the 
structural programs. The protests were 
prompted by food shortages and rising 
prices; they led to the death of twenty- 
two people, according to government 
figures. In Uganda the structural 
adjustment programs led to cuts in 
education and prompted a series of 
strikesby students and theacademicstaff 
at Makerere University in Kampala. In 
December 1990 the police killed striking 
students of Makerere University. The list 
is interminable.l4 
In a similar vein,Afrrca Forum argues 
that the politics of economic reforms are 
incompatible with respect for human 
rights and the democratization of 
African states: 
The West, the IMF and the World Bank, 
have agreed that along with dialogue with 
autocrats, the way tosupport democracy in 
Africa is through structural adjustment 
programmes, which supposedly promote 
democracy by strengthening the market 
and civil society against thestate. This is a 
dangerous illusion. In Africa's present 
circumstances, democratization and 
structural adjustment are not really 
compatible. The SAPS which arefoisted on 
Africa are so traumatic, so painful and 
tragic in their efects that they generate 
passionate opposition which-has to be 
overcome by force. SAPS have immensely 
inflated the coercive authoritarianism of 
African political systems and have 
generally led to the breakdown of the social 
consensus which sustains democ~acy.'~ 
R. Carver goes on to observe the 
World Bank lending policies as they 
relate to respect for human rights in 
Africa: 
Under its articles of agreement, the World 
Bank takes only "economic 
considerations" into account when 
deciding on lending. This is interpreted to 
mean that the Bankcannot consider respect 
for human rights as a criterion for lending. 
This can lead to decisions which are not 
only morally ojfensive, but also make no 
economic sense, suck as the $70 million 
loan to Somalia in 1989, at a time when 
government counter-insurgency policies 
20 Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1992) 
were tearing the wuntry apart-with a 
particularly disruptive effect on the 
principal export commodity, livestock. The 
loan was for agricultural development. . . . 
But ifthe WorldBankhasbeen reluctant to 
consider human rights, it has become 
increasingly concerned by what it calls 
"good governance, "notably in its 1989 
report on Africa, "From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth " In his foreword to 
thereport, World Bank President Barber B. 
Conable talked of "An administration that 
is namcntnble to its public" and "a better 
balance between . . . the gawmment and 
the governed. " But is it good governance 
for a government to close the universities, 
detain trade union leaders, and fill the 
mortuaries with the corpses of those who 
opposeitsstructuralndjustment program? 
And if not, when has the Bank raised its 
voice in criticism?16 
"Natural Disasters" 
The continent has experienced periods of 
severe drought since the 1970s. The 
droughts have not only initiated new 
environmental and land quality 
problems, but have also exposed the 
weaknesses of the economic and 
agricultural systems in the region. As a 
result of the droughts, high population 
growth rates and subsequent famines, 
millions have perished and many more 
have become internally displaced. Those 
who managed to aoss national borders 
became environmental refugees." The 
impact of the disasters differs depending 
on class, gender, age group and location; 
that is, pastoralists, peasants, disabled 
persons, poor women, children and the 
elderly suffer the most. The promotion of 
cash crops at the expense of food crops; 
changes in land tenure (which leave 
much of agriculturally suitable land in 
the hands of a few individuals); the 
creation of large game parks in areas 
where the majority of the population is 
landless; wars that disrupt agriculture, 
environmental degradation; the 
greenhouse effect andits deterioration of 
the ozone layer; deforestation, poor 
communication infrastructure and high 
population growth add up to a human- 
made disaster that may seem "natural." 
It should be noted that environmental 
degradation adds to the pressure from 
which socio-economic and political 
conflicts emerge. Thus, it is difficult to 
draw a firm line between those refugees 
who are victims of environmental 
disasters and those who are victims of 
human-made political and economic 
oppression. Yet victims of "natural 
disasters" who cross nationalborders are 
often considered nonpolitical refugees 
or bogus refugees. 
Costs and Benefits to Host 
Countries 
More often than not, the impact of 
refugees on host countries are presented 
only in terms of burdens. Yet refugees 
may also contribute to the socio- 
economic development of host 
countries. On the question of costs, it is 
generally agreed that the influx of 
refugees overwhelm the capacity of host 
countries to respond with adequate 
The escalating indebtedness, 
the high rate of mortality, 
malnutrition, famine and 
rapidly declining 
productivity are clear signs 
of the continuous economic 
and political q i m l i z a t i o n  
of the continent. 
assistance. While it is difficult to offer 
specific verifiable data on the costs 
refugees impose on host countries, the 
basic outlines of the costs are quite 
visible. First, as pointed out earlier, the 
majority of African statesare exceedingly 
poor. The decline in trade, the rapid 
decrease in per capita gross domestic 
product, the debt crisis and the impact of 
structural adjustment programs have 
reduced the capacity of host 
governments to meet employment, 
health care, education, shelter and food 
needs of their nationals. Finally, there is 
a very high ratio of registered and 
unregistered refugees to nationals. 
Indeed, the magnitude of additional 
pressure that refugees exert on resources 
varies within and between host 
countries, depending on a number of 
factors: the nature and magnitude of 
existing socio-economic and political 
crises in the host country, the policies of 
the host government towards refugees, 
land policies and availability of arable 
land, the size of the refugee population, 
and the ratio of refugees to nationals of 
the host country. The negative impact of 
refugees may include additional 
pressure on economic and social 
infrastructures and aggravate 
deforestation. 
On the other hand, in some African 
countries (or at least parts of them), 
refugees have contributed to social and 
economic development. As R.F. Gorman 
has noted: 
. . . in Tanzania, where most of the refugee 
population of about 170,000 has been 
present for a decade or more, refugees have 
become productive contributors to the 
national economy. Most of them live in 
settlements which have been handed over 
by government administration. Many of 
these villages were deueloped in virgin 
lands, and thus represent a net increase in 
cultivated acreage for Tanzania. 
Nevertheless, some settlements have been 
more successful than others. Refugees in 
Katumba constituteabout 35-40percent of 
the population but produce 90 percent of 
the area's crops. . . . They even pay taxes to 
the Tanzanian government.18 
The positive contribution refugees 
made was the result of a number of 
related factors: the refugees' 
resourcefulness, the government's 
positive refugee policies, and the 
assistance provided during the initial 
stages of the projects by the international 
community. Similarly, Ugandan 
refugees who were settled on virgin 
lands in Haut, Zaire also made a positive 
contribution to the socio-economic 
development of the region.19 
Durable Solutions? 
Eliminating conditions that generate 
refugees is the only durable solution to 
the refugee crisis on the continent. In 
retrospect, the three widely discussed 
but poorly implemented durable 
solutions--voluntary repatriation, local 
integration and resettlement in third 
countries of asylum-are, at best, 
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curative rather than preventive. Put 
succinctly, the ideal solutions only treat 
the symptoms and do little to remove the 
root causes of flights. Implementing 
these three solutions constitutes an 
integral element of the UNHCR's 
mandate: 
The United Nations High Commissioner 
for R e f i p s  (UNHCR), acting under the 
authority of the General Assembly, shall 
assume the function of providing 
international protection, under the 
auspices of the United Nations to refugees 
who fall within the scope of the present 
Statuteandof seekingpermanent solutions 
of refugees by assisting Governments and, 
subject to the approval of the Government 
concerned, private organizations to 
facilitate the wluntaryrepatriation of such 
refugees, or their'assimilation within new 
cornm~nities.~~ 
Voluntary Repatriation 
In theory, voluntary repatriation applies 
when a refugee makes the decision to 
voluntarily return to hidher country of 
origin. It is assumed that the decision to 
return is based on a refugee's well- 
informed perception of freedom from 
any form of persecution and a radically 
improved situation that is more secure. 
In its support for voluntary repatriation 
as the most satisfactory solution to 
African refugee problems, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
has appealed to refugee-producing 
countries to encourage refugees toreturn 
home by: 1) redressing the situations 
that motivated refugees to leave their 
countries; 2) assuring refugees that they 
would be welcomed back to resume 
normal and useful lives without fear of 
persecution or punishment for having 
left their country; 3) assisting returning 
refugees to resume lives in their countries 
of origin; and 4) granting a general 
amnesty and welcoming and 
reintegrating returning refugees into 
their own society, with full rights and 
privileges rest~red.~' In that respect, the 
essential character of repatriation is that 
it is voluntary. This is in keeping with the 
principle of nonrefoulement, which states 
that under no circumstances shall a 
refugee be expelled or returned "to the 
frontiers of temtories where his life or 
freedom wouldbe threatenedonaccount 
of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion."21 In practice, 
however, host governments, UNHCR 
officials and other organizations 
assisting refugees exert various 
pressures on refugees to repatriate. Also, 
contrary to the principle of 
nonrefoulement, some refugees have been 
expelled to their countries of origin. At 
times, refugees are compelled to 
repatriate due to enormous hardships in 
countries of asylum. More often than not, 
refugees do not know their rights under 
international covenants and are not 
provided with accurate and adequate 
information on which to make the 
decision to repatriate or not to repatriate. 
Evenif refugees knew their rights, alarge 
number of refugees in Africa are not 
registered with the UNHCR. In that 
respect, refugee rights are not applicable 
to the de facto refugees. 
Repatriation has taken place in 
Africa under different circumstances. 
. . . as long as the root causes 
of deprivation and 
persecution are not 
resolved, and protection and 
assistance not provided to 
those already uprooted, 
the Afican refigee c h i s  will 
continue to escalate. 
For example, many refugees returned 
home at the end of colonial rule in 
Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, 
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. 
However, in Mozambique and Angola 
the "durable solution" did not endure 
the postliberation crisis. Changes of 
regimes in Uganda, for example, have 
led to both repatriation and flights. 
Repeated declarations of amnesty by 
various regimes in Africa have also led to 
repatriations. However, as such 
declarations have proven to be quite 
empty, more flights follow repatriations. 
The point is, repatriation cannot be a 
viable option as long as the root causes of 
flights are not eliminated. 
Local Integration 
Among other things, two fadors make 
local integration the only major durable 
solutionto the refugee problem. They are 
the persistence of the causes of refugee 
flows in most countries of origin and the 
fad that most African refugees are not 
considered candidates for resettlement 
in third countries. The definition of 
integration itself is problematic. For 
example, the UNHCR defines 
integration as "the process by which the 
refugee is assimilated into the social 
process and economic life of a new 
comm~nity."~~ B.E. Harrell-Bond posits: 
Although the objective of assistance to 
refugees is said to be their integration into 
the host community, the term 
"integration" has not been satisfactorily 
defined. For the aid community, those 
refugees whoare not assisted, havenotonly 
settled "spontaneously, " but have also 
achieved "spontaneous integration, "and 
are thus not in need of assistance. Their 
success is attributed to the belief that as 
colonial boundaries intersected established 
communities, people who fled across a 
border are welcomed by their kith and kin 
with whom they share common origins, 
languageand culture. Theseare important 
but not sufficient conditions for 
integration. The most important one is the 
availability of resources. . . . A wry simple 
definition of integration would be a 
situation in which host and refugee 
communities are able to co-exist, sharing 
the same resources-both economic and 
social-with no greater mutual conflict 
than that which exists within the host 
community. Such a definition will not 
stand up to detailed analysis. . . . The 
present lack of agreement on the meaning 
of the term "integration" and its general 
association with "assimilation" and 
"permanence, " have created a resistance 
on the part of both host countries and 
refugees to any policy which appears to be 
promoting the absorption of the refugee 
community into the country of asylum. 
The fact that is overlooked in these debates 
is that only a minority of African refugees 
are presently objects of aid programmes. 
Mostaresurvivingby dint of theircapacity 
to co-exist with locals under extremely 
difficult  condition^.^^ 
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If the various competing or 
supplementary definitions are tested, it 
becomes obvious that local integration 
and self-sufficiency are illusory. First, 
refugees lack security and protection. 
Second, most African refugees do not 
receive any form of aid programs. 
Finally, the majority of African refugees 
live in extremely poor African countries. 
The economic crisis in these countries are 7' compounded by "natural disasters," 
n widespread famine, massive 
unemployment and a collapse of social 
services. In retrospect, S. Pitterman 
maintains that: "we cannot expect 
refugees to become economically self- 
sufficient in a vacuum . . . refugee 
settlements can prosper and refugees can 
contribute to the welfare of the host 
population only in so far as broader 
economic integration is fo~tered."~~ 
Resettlement 
Resettlement in third countries of asylum 
is considered another "durable solution" 
to the refugee problem. However, most 
African refugees are not considered 
candidates for resettlement in third 
countries of asylum. This "solution," 
which involves an extremely tiny 
fraction of African refugees, does very 
little to address the problem of refugees 
on the continent. Therefore, it is clear that 
as long as the root causes of deprivation 
and persecution are not resolved, and 
protection and assistance not provided 
to those already uprooted, the African 
refugee crisis will continue to escalate. 
The Case of Kenya: 
Background to the Internal 
Crisis 
At the turn of the century, several million 
acres of high-altitude fertile land in 
Kenya was allocated to European settlers 
by the British colonial power. Since the 
territory had to pay the bill for 
colonization and the settlers were 
determined to enjoy a high standard of 
living, the African population was 
subordinated, controlled and exploited 
through land, labour, taxation and 
administrative policies.26 As a result of 
these policies, the settlers established 
monopoly over land, labour, access to 
transport, marketing facilities and 
technical information. The allocation of 
land and the way the country was 
incorporated into the international 
economic system, therefore, had 
enormous disruptive impact on the 
Africans. The majority of Africans 
became landless squatters and labourers. 
It was therefore not surprising that the 
question of land and other critical 
agricultural resources were at the centre 
of the struggle for independence. 
The Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) and the Kenya African 
Democraticunion (KADU) were the two 
political parties that competed for the 
In retrospect, the three 
widely discussed but poorly 
implemented durable 
solutions-voluntary 
repatriation, local 
integration and resettlement 
in third countries of 
a s y l u ~ r e  at best, curative 
rather than preventive. 
political domination of the country. Both 
parties were formed in 1960 when 
national political parties were legalized 
for the first time since the declaration of 
the Emergency in 1952.27 KANU was 
essentially a party of the Kikuyu, the Luo 
and the Kamba. KADU, on the other 
hand, was predominantly a party of the 
Kalenjin, the Luhya, the Masai and 
various peoples of the Coast?* The 
critical differences between the parties 
had to do with the question of how and 
by whom should the land be controlled. 
The composition of the parties was 
therefore largely determined by ethnic 
rivalries over land claims. 
There were basic factors that shaped 
the choice of whether to ally with the 
Kikuyu and their claims to the White 
Highlands or with the Kalenjin in 
opposition to Kikuyu. Two groups 
proved pivotal in the manoeuvering: the 
Abaluhya and the Luo. The Abaluhya 
claimed Trans Nzoia, where Kikuyu had 
worked as farm labourers and therefore 
claimed land; the Luo possessed no land 
claims that conflicted with those of the 
Kikuyu. The Luo did, however, possess 
claims conflicting with those of the 
Abaluhya, as in the area of Maseno, and 
with the Kalenjin, in the areas bordering 
the Kipsigis and Nandi Hills. In the 
search for partners in the competition for 
political power in Kenya, the Luo 
therefore allied with the Kikuyu; they 
joined KANU. The other groups 
combined into KADU and sought to 
forestall efforts by their rivals to secure a 
political majority. Both parties sought 
allies from groups that did not live 
directly adjacent to the Highlands: 
persons in the semiarid zones of the East 
and North and people along the CoastF9 
Following KANU victories in 
preindependence elections and the 
release of some militant nationalists, 
including Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya 
obtained independence in December 
1963 and Kenyatta became president. 
Although KADU became a minority 
party, it was successful in its struggle for 
majimbo (regionalism). As a matter of fact, 
the party "secured a federal structure of 
government, in which power devolved 
upon a series of regional assemblies- 
assemblies whose most important duty 
was the administration of land rights."30 
According to C. Leys, the colonial 
government, which was very 
sympathetic towards KADU, supported 
the demand for majimbo. Consequently, 
in 1962 the government urged the leaders 
of KANU to accept it as the price of 
getting a date fixed for a fresh election 
leading to political independen~e.~' 
Througha series of political manoeuvres, 
which included offering material 
incentives to some prominent elites in 
KADU, the ruling party reached a 
political compromise with the 
opposition party. Consequently, KADU 
disbandedin November 1964 and Daniel 
Toiritich arap Moi (the current president 
of Kenya) and his colleagues joined 
KANU. With the demise of KADU, 
regional assemblies were discarded in 
December 1964. Contrary to the KANU's 
1963 election manifesto, which promised 
land for the landless, the distribution of 
land was largely left to market forces. 
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The collapse of KADU also deprived the 
radical wing of KANU (whose 
leadership included Vice-president 
Oginga Odinga) of its strategies in 
exploiting the conflicts between KADU 
and the majority conservative wing of 
KANU. The radicals who had advocated 
for growth with equity in the country 
withdrew from KANU and formed 
Kenya People's Union (KPU). However, 
the new party was short-lived. Its 
members were constantly harassed and 
intimidated with impunity by the 
government. In the final analysis, the 
party was banned and Kenya became a 
de fado one-party state. 
Under Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya 
remained more stable than the 
neighbouring states of Uganda, the 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. This 
period, however, was also characterized 
by nepotism, corruption, political 
oppression, violations of human rights 
and adverse poverty for the majority of 
Kenyans. In his attempt to promote the 
Kikuyu ascendency, Kenyatta also 
established the dominance of his own 
Kiambu clan. "His clannishness not only 
fed tribalism but exacerbated tensions 
among Kikuyu. Instead of convertingthe 
ruling party.. .into a truly national party, 
he allowed it to decline into a moribund 
movement. He increasingly governed 
thecountry througha small coterie made 
up mainly of Kikuyu "old guards" and 
members of his family."32 
Kenya's first postindependence era 
ended with the death of Kenyatta on 
August 22, 1978.33 During his 
inauguration as Kenya's second 
president on October 10, 1978, Daniel 
arap Moi indicated that he would run an 
open government, fight ethnicity, stamp 
out the widespread corruption and 
flagrant breaches of law that had 
characterized Kenyatta's rule. He 
immediately released political detainees. 
He also attempted to remove the 
suspicion the Kenyatta regime had about 
Luos-especially after the violent scenes 
in Kisumu during Kenyatta's last visit in 
1969. Soon, however, it became apparent 
that Moi had to devote much of his time 
attending to immediate threats to his 
presidency. Tobe sure, opposition to Moi 
datesbackto 1976when some prominent 
politicians wanted to change the 
Constitution so that Vice-Resident Moi 
would be barred from becoming 
president upon Kenyatta's death. As 
soon as Moi assumed power, then 
Attorney General Charles Njonjo told 
both parliament and the nation that an 
attempt to assassinate Moi and some 
politicians had been preempted by the 
government. The alleged ringleaders of 
the abortive plot, Njonjo pointed out, 
included ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Dr. Njoroge Mungai, and a senior police 
officer, Joseph Mungai.jq Moi's sense of 
insecurity was heightened by a series of 
student unrests, the activities of an 
opposition group (Mwakenya) and the 
1982 abortive coup. 
Since the 1982 abortive coup, Moi 
has shown signs of increasing 
It is eqzuzlly true that the 
UNHCR office in Nairobi 
has contributed to the crisis 
due to incompetence, 
disorganization and 
indifference to 
re fusees' plights. 
suspiciousness about plots against him. 
He is especially suspicious of the Luo 
and Kikuyu. Having purged the 
military, the cabinet and public service of 
his immediate "enemies," one might 
assume that he would feel more 
confident of his position. However, since 
1982 Moi appears to be more restless and 
ruthless. The president, ministers and 
party officials demand absolute and 
unquestioning loyalty to themselves. In 
many instances, ministers and party 
officials have enthusiastically castigated 
people who questioned the president's 
policies. As H. Burkhalter and R. Omaar 
point out, "power has become 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
the president and a few close advisers, 
most of them from his own Kalenjin 
ethni~group."~~Religious rganizations, 
academic institutions, the Law Society, 
trade unions, local and international 
human rights organizations have 
attacked the government's poor human 
rights record. 
Under enormous internal and 
external pressure, the government has 
legalized multiparty politics and is 
preparing to hold multiparty elections. 
Multiparty politics, however, have been 
characterized by intimidation, ethnic 
violence and lawlessness. The country's 
relative stability is slowly becoming an 
illusion. Since December 1990, violent 
ethnic clashes continue to ravage the t 
entire country. The ethnic violence has 
left several hundred people dead, tens of 
thousands internally displaced and food 
granaries destroyed. At the centre of the 
violence is the struggle for control over 
the scarce resources and land. The 
instability caused by ethnic and political 
clashes have compounded the food crisis 
in the country. The country has been 
facing severe droughts for the past two 
years. As President Moi indicated on 
June 9,1992, it is estimated that over one 
million Kenyans face starvation unless 
immediate corrective measures are 
taken. In his appeal to foreign donors for 
food aid, the president pointed out that 
of the affected population, a total of 
680,000 in twenty districts have been in 
need of urgent assistance since the end of 
It should be added that the 
problem of food security is made worse 
by the country's extremely high 
population growth rates. In fact, the 
country has one of the highest 
population growth rates in the world 
(about 4.1 percent a year in the 1980s). In 
September 1985 President Moi drew 
attention to the dangers of the high 
population growth rate: 
Unless we slow down the rate of our 
population growth, we shall have decades 
of dependence on imports and decades of 
malnutrition, and even possible starvation 
. . . starvation is being.threatened by low 
food production, periodic drought and 
rapid population growth. Every year in 
Kenya, we have to produce enough food to 
feed an additional one million people. I f  the 
population growth continues at the same h 
rate, the country will requireas much food 
in theyear2000. Wehavenochoice; neither 
do we have the time to make this choice. We 
must therefore reduce our population 
growth rate.37 
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It is therefore clear that Kenya, 
which is located in a turbulent region, is 
sliding into major chaos. Indeed, more 
countries could potentially be exposed to 
the same fate unless efforts are made to 
reverse the trend. The crisis also makes 
life increasingly difficult for the refugees 
in the country. 
Refugee Crisis in Kenya 
Since independence in 1963, Kenya has 
provided asylum to  thousands of 
refugees from the turbulent countries of 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, the 
Sudanand South Africa. Compared with 
her neighbours, Kenya hosted relatively 
fewer refugees until 1991. For example, 
in December 1985 there were 8,574 
recognized asylum seekers and an 
estimated 8,000 to 16,000 de  facto 
refugees. In 1990 and 1991 there were 
subsequently 14,400 and 80,000 
UNHCR-recognized refugees. At the 
end of May 1992, the UNHCR released 
the figures listed in Table 1. 
At about the time the UNHCR was 
releasing its figures, over 20,000 
Sudanese refugees-12,000 of them 
unaccompanied minors-arrived on 
June 5,1992 in Lokichoggio, Kenya after 
trekking over approximately 800 krn of 
rugged terrain. 
According to various organizations 
that were assistingrefugees in Kenya, the 
UNHCR figures are extremely low for 
that particular period. In his statement of 
June 9, 1992, President Moi indicated 
that: 
To date, there are more than 460,000 
refugees in the country, while they 
continue to increase daily, hence further 
depleting our meagre resources. At  the 
moment, there are over 287,000 people 
seeking asylum from the three 
neighbouring countries of Somalia, 
Ethiopia and Sudan. In addition, there are 
over 150,000 unprocessed refugees in 
various parts of the country, especially at 
border towns of Dobley, Bulla, Hawa, Sufu 
andKapeta whileothers cross theborder on 
a daily basis.% 
The dramatic increase of refugees is 
a direct result of the aisis in the region. In 
the Sudan, the Islamic government in 
Khartoum has continued its war of 
extermination and domination of the 
predominantly non-Muslim and non- 
Arab Southerners. The Khartoum 
government, now heavily supported by 
Libya, Iraq and Iran, is scoring victory 
after victory against the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army, led Dr. John Garang. 
Thecapture of strategic areas in theSouth 
by the Khartoum government and the 
escalation of war have led to new waves 
of refugees.39 It is ironic that the 
international community has done 
practically nothing to stop the genocide 
in the Sudan. InSomalia, various political 
and military factions are engaged in 
fierce and bloody fighting for control of 
Table 1: Refugees in Kenya 
Assisted in camps: 
Liboi 64,000 
Walda 36,799 
If0 30,000 
Dagahaley 25,500 
Thika 3,800 
Mombasa 
Utange camp 9,500 
Outside camp 8,169 
Baravanese 7,000 
Magengo 1,300 
Subtotal 186,068 
Somalis 
Ethiopians 
Somalis 
Somalis 
Mixed 
Somalis 
Somalis 
Somalis 
Somalis 
Assisted in border sites: 
Mandera 40,000 Somalis 
Banissa 10,000 Ethiopians 
Habasweini 2,400 Ethiopians 
Gurar 2,500 Ethiopians 
Subtotal 54,900 
Assisted refugees 
Grand Total: 240,968 
Nonassisted refugees in areas of 
Nairobi/ Mombasa 
20,000 (estimate) 
Total assisted and nonassisted 
refugees 260,968 
Source: UNHCR, information Bulletin 
No. 8 (May 29,1992):3 
(Theestimated numberofSomalirefugees 
in Kenya has risen to 600,000 as of 
early September 1992.) 
sections of the disintegrating country. 
The chronic violence and lawlessness 
that followed the overthrow of dictator 
Siad Barre and the continuing drought 
have claimed tens of thousands of lives 
and forced many more people to flee. 
Almost the entire population of Somalia 
is internally displaced and face severe 
starvation. As in the case of the Sudan, 
the UN and the international community 
have beenreluctant tointerveneand save 
the innocent victims. Since the 
overthrow of dictator Mengistu, large 
numbers of ex-soldiers and tens of 
thousands of civilians from Ethiopia 
have fled to Kenya. The escalating 
interclan violence between Boranas and 
other clans in southern Ethiopia, as well 
as the severe drought also continue to 
force refugees to flee to Kenya.40 Early 
repatriation is not an option to be 
considered at this stage. This means that 
the refugees will stay in Kenya for a long 
time. 
With the current refugee crisis in the 
country, Kenya's refugee policies have 
increasingly come under serious 
scrutiny. Although Kenya is signatory to 
the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the 
1967 Protocol and the 1969 Organization 
of African Unity Convention, its policies 
are largely inconsistent with its regional 
and international obligations. Kenya's 
refugee policies fluctuate depending on 
internal and regional politics. Many 
refugees have been denied asylum, left 
in "asylum limbo," forcefully 
repatriated, detained and harassed. In 
keeping with its hidden policy of 
deterrence, the government seems 
determined to make life extremely hard 
for refugees. It also hopes that the 
hardships will lead to early repatriation. 
In a nutshell, the rights of refugees are 
grossly violated. Therefore, the refugee 
crisis in Kenya is partly the result of 
Kenyan refugee policy and lack of 
international assistance for the refugees. 
It is equally true that the UNHCR office 
in Nairobi has contributed to the crisis 
due to incompetence, disorganization 
and indifference to refugees' plights. 
Some refugee bodies, including the 
defunct Joint Refugee Services of Kenya 
(JRSK), have also been blamed for 
incompetence and corruption. 
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